S. Bringing in additional parties
"Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under section 4 of this title may be pending, that the ends of justice require that other parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned, whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or Jpot; and subpoenas to that end may be served in any district by the marshal thereof. " § 6. Forfeiture of property in transit "Any property owned under any contract or by any combination, or pursuant to any conspiracy (and being the subject thereof) mentioned in section i of this title, and being in the course of transpbrtation from one State to dnother, or to a foreign country, shall be forfeited to the United States, and may be seized 'and condemned by like proceedings as those provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure, and condemnation of property imported into the United States contrary to law. For an excellent analysis of the meaning of interstate commerce and the of whether there is, in fact, any legal distinction between "interstate commerce" and "intrastate commerce affecting interstate commerce," and if so, what kind of purely local conduct may be within the reach of the Act. Although the subleties which are involved here are significant, they have received but scant attention from the courts. For example, a combination to fix the price of a commodity in interstate commerce is a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 3 On the other hand, a price-fixing agreement which is made either before the flow of interstate commerce has begun or after it has ended is an offense only if it has some effect on interstate commerce. This latter principle, now known as the "affectation doctrine"--a phrase first used by Mr. Justice Rutledge in Mandeville Farms v. Sugar Co.--has had a most curious and erratic history, but at long last, it seems to have achieved some degree of stability. This paper will trace its evolution and examine some of its substantive contents and procedural effects.
In the first Sherman Act lawsuit to confront the Supreme Court, United States v. E. C. Knight,' the validity of a series of mergers in the sugar-refining industry was questioned. The Court, in resolving the issue, expressly distinguished between production and interstate commerce, and concluded that the antitrust laws applied only to the latter. , where the Court explained its rationale for adjudicating certain acts to be per se violations of the Sherman Act and specified certain practices which the courts have deemed illegal in and of themselves. These are (a) price fixing, (b) division of markets, (c) group boycotts, and (d) tying arrangements. The Court considered that these transactions not only have a pernicious effect on competition, but also lacked any redeeming virtue. The Court, therefore, conclusively presumed such conduct to be unreasonable in fact, and, accordingly, held it to be contrary to law. By this judicial process the Court avoided an elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm which results from any of these four kinds of conduct or the economic justification for its use. 
xs6.U.S. 1 (1895).
[ Vol. 1959: 236 Thus, it held that a monopoly in the manufacture of sugar was beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. 7 Almost at once, however, this "qocal conduct doctrine began to undergo a process of erosion, in the course of which the Supreme Court freely applied the antitrust laws to acts occurring before there had been any movement across state lines. First, in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 8 the Court, abandoning a narrow, atomistic approach and looking rather to the future of the goods in question, saw a direct and immediate, and not an indirect and incidental, adverse effect on the goods' interstate movement and found a Sherman Act violation 9 Shortly thereafter, the Court, in Bement v. National Harrow Co.,' 0 although still citing the Knight case as governing law, held it inapplicable in a situation where not only the production of goods, but also their sale throughout the country at noncompetitive prices was involved. In Swift v. United States," too, the Court, finding a Sherman Act violation in terms of both a purpose to restrain and to monopolize and an effect upon interstate commerce that was not "accidental, secondary, remote or merely probable,"' 2 dismissed the Knight case with the observation that the conduct of the defendants there did not have interstate monopoly as a "primary end" or "necessary consequence." 3 The C6urt acknowledged, however, that at times, the line which separates intrastate from interstate commerce is a rather fine one. 4 The next in this series of cases, Loewe v. Lawlor," 8 was a leading 'The Court rejected the argument of the Government that the power to control the manufacture of refined sugar was a monopoly over a necessary of life and that interstate commerce was thus indispensable for the consumption of sugar by much of the country's population, noting that "the fact that an article is manufactured for export to another State does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce. . . I" d. at 13. 175 U.S. 21, (18 99 ). ' The Court said: "The direct purpose of the combination in the Knight case was the control of the manufacture of sugar. There was no combination or agreement, in terms, regarding the future disposition of the manufactured article5 nothing looking to a transaction in the nature of interstate commerce." Id. at 240.
antitrust case before the passage of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts 16 and was largely responsible for this subsequent legislation which partially exempted organized labor from the federal antitrust laws. Here, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act prohibitions applied to the boycott activities of a union and its member-employees of a hat manufacturer in one state and his customers in other states. In so reasoning, the Court made short shrift of the Knight case. 17 It remained only for the landmark Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 8 to deal the Knight doctrine its unequivocally disabling blow. Later cases which referred to the Knight case served only further to sap its waning vitality. 19 the Sherman, Clayton, and Norris-LaGuardia Acts created a statutory exemption from the antitrust laws for the conduct involved. Since intrastate commerce was not the focal point of reference or of issue in these cases, this paper will not dwell on their details; but there will be later reference to some Sherman Act applications where these factors of immunity did not operate. to the contrary notwithstanding, a restraint or monopolization of the theatrical business was held dearly to be within the scope of the Sherman Act, even though the actual performance of a stage attraction "is of course a local affair," and once interstate commerce is shown, the Sherman Act was held to be applicable even to "locl" restraints on that commerce. 1 To the same effect was the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. International Boxing Club of New York 3 2 There, the promotion of professional championship boxing contests on a multistate basis, coupled with the sales of rights to televise, broadcast, and film the contests for interstate transmission, was held to be ivithin the scope of the Sherman Act if the conduct either imposes an illegal restraint on or con- The recent baseball, theatre, boxing, and football cases evoked several concurring and dissenting opinions and a veritable flood of law review commentary 5 It is likely, however, that these four adjudications have firmly laid to rest the ghost of the Federal Baseball case, unless a baseball situation possibly forces a technical and reluctant adherence to precedent.
Following the ill-fated Federal Baseball decision, the Supreme Court continued to give some lip service to the so-called legal difference between conduct in the stream of interstate commerce and local intrastate conduct---that is, until the Mandeville case. 7 Decided entirely on the sufficiency of the plaintiff's amended complaint, this case apparently turned not only on specific allegations, but on economic facts regarding the effect upon interstate commerce of a price-fixing agreement on a purely local level of which the Court appeared to take judicial notice. The Court rejected the contention that the growing and selling of beets should be considered separate and distinct from the refining and marketing of their sugar. Since these various processes involved and comprised an economic continuum, it was deemed necessary to consider not only the varying methods by which the several processes were organized, related, and conducted, but also the effects of production and processing on commerce across state lines.
Thus, it was considered irrelevant and unnecessary to search for a sharp point or a line where intrastate commerce ends and interstate commerce begins, the crucial inquiry rather being whether effects forbidden by the antitrust laws reach from processes occurring within to those occurring without the state. If a proscribed effect upon interstate comId. at 24x.
at 352 U.S. 445 (1957). Since this case turned on the sufficiency of the complaint, the Court assumed as true the allegations that the National Football League, its ten member clubs, and others had conspired to destroy a competitive league by boycotting it and its players and to do certain other described illegal acts.
" merce is present, either actually or potentially, the vital question should only be whether this effect is sufficiently substantial to violate the Sherman Act. The Act, the Court indicated, would be inoperative only where the local conduct was not intended to have and did not have direct contact with interstate commerce. Price-fixing by purchasers wholly within a state, however, might be an inseparable element of a larger program dependent for its success upon activity which affects commerce between the states. The vital question, the Court held, was the effect of the local conduct on any phase of the commerce involved. The Supreme Court made certain further observations. The mere change in the form of the commodity or even a complete change in essential quality by intermediate processing does not defeat the application of the Sherman Act to practices occurring either during those processes or before they begin when these practices have effects forbidden by law. In fact, the price-fixing agreement in question had a substantial effect on the sale of sugar outside of the state. Because the sale of sugar beets by the growers was completely dominated by the sugar refiners, who were the sole purchasers, two distinct consequences followed from the latter's agreement to pay uniform prices. An immediate and inevitable one was upon the price received by the growers, since they were deprived of the opportunity and freedom to dispose of their crops on a competitive basis. In addition, there was a necessary suppression of competition in the interstate distribution of sugar. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Court held as a matter of law that when a purely intrastate refining manufacturing process occurs as an intermediate step in an integrated industry which has interstate phases, the fact that such processing occurs on a local level is no defense in an antitrust case.
Another recent case which directly raised the same problem was Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States. 8 There, the court expressly distinguished between conduct in the stream of interstate commerce and intrastate conduct which substantially affects interstate commerce. 9 The court's lengthy analysis took the following tack: Conduct may "affect" interstate commerce in two different ways in an antitrust context, both of which may warrant prosecution. First, conduct may occur wholly on the local or state level in intrastate com- [Vol. 1959: 236 merce, but substantially affect interstate commerce. These intrastate acts may occur before goods enter the flow of commerce, and their ultimate effect or impact on interstate commerce need only be a qualitative, and not a quantitative, one. This is either a question of law or a mixed question of law and fact. 40 A price-fixing agreement on a purely local basis is not a per se violation of the Sherman Act and is outside the operation of this statute, however, unless it, in fact, "substantially affects" interstate commerce.
In addition and in contrast to the intrastate situation is the "in commerce" situation, involving acts occurring within the flow of interstate commerce. These acts, like those occurring in intrastate commerce, must affect or have an effect on interstate commerce, and their ultimate effect or impact on interstate commerce, too, need only be a qualitative one. As a matter of law, an agreement to fix prices or to divide markets is a violation per se. Otherwise, the effect of an alleged illegal transaction may be a question of law or a mixed question of law and fact. Thus, agreements to fix prices 41 or agreements to divide markets 42 are unreasonable per se, and the final effect of either of such agreements on interstate commerce and the substantiality of their effect become questions of law under the facts.
The court did not dearly delineate its decisional process in formulating the legal doctrines governing the particular type of transaction involved here nor in specifying the circumstances which would bring them into operation. There is some doubt as to just what the court meant.when it said that the test of the ultimate effect or impact of wholly intrastate acts on interstate commerce is a question of law or a mixed question of law and fact. If it is a question of law, the court did not verbalize, either generally or particularly, the circumstances of the transaction, except in terms of "ultimate effect or impact of the act on interstate commerce." The tenor of the opinion, however, seems to indicate that mere price-fixing in a local transaction, without more, is immune from the Sherman Act. The court also appeared disinclined to assume factual effects or to take judicial notice of them, as other courts appear to have done. Nevertheless, support is found in other judicial opinions for the view that under the "affectation doctrine;' the boundary Under the "affectation doctrine," the effect upon interstate commerce which must be shown is said to be substantial. Further, the courts have held that it need be only qualitative, 47 and not quantitative. 48 Hence, the Sherman Act has been construed to forbid wholly intrastate conduct if interstate commerce feels its pinch 9 The local conduct need only be intimately related to and have an essential adverse effect on "'See note 14 supra. In United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954) the flow across a state line of a subject matter of trade." To violate the antitrust laws, this conduct must, however, have a result which is more than merely casual, incidental, remote, conjectural, sporadic, or unsubstantial. l The criterion of "dose and substantial" relation between intrastate activities and interstate commerce is a practical standard, and not a technical concept.
5 2 Essentially it poses a question of degree, and hence it is not susceptible of rigid formulation.es Thus, an artificial or mechanical rule will not work 54 dose scrutiny of the particular facts of each situation rather is needed in the context of our expanding national economy. 55 There The question of the application of the statute is one of intent and effect, and is not to be determined by arbitrary assumptions."
The legal standard employed comprises ingredients which range from the relatively specific to the general. The following have been adduced as proof of the "substantial qualitative effect" essential to an offense: Within the last twenty years, the Sherman Act has operated on a variety of local acts which were held to have had an adverse impact upon the stream of interstate commerce. Among those worthy of noting here are: (a) an agreement between electrical contractors, manufacturers and a union, all in the same locality, providing that the contractors should buy only from the manufacturers who should sell only to contractors employing members of the union;" 66 (b) an agreement between a group of local manufacturers of lumber products and a group of trade unions and their officials and business agents providing that the former should refuse to purchase any materials or articles on which any work was done by a mill, a cabinet shop, or distributor for wages or under working conditions failing to conform to those specified in the agreement; 6 7 (c) an agreement between garment jobbers and an asociation of stitching contractors and its officers providing (i) that the jobbers should give all their work to members of the association in good standing if their price and quality compared with those of nonmember contractors who had collective-bargaining agreements with a certain union, (2) that the contractors should refrain from giving the jobbers any secret rebates, and (3) that the jobbers should divide the work equally among the members of the association 68 (d) an agreement between a trade association of local plastering contractors and a local union providing that they should suppress competition among the plasterers, prevent out-of-state contractors from doing business in the local area, and bar the entry of new local contractors without the approval of a private examining board created by the union5" (e) an agreement between milk dairies and a milk-drivers' union providing that the parties should prevent retail stores from selling milk for a price less than that charged by the dairies for home deliveries57O (f) an agreement among an insurance exchange and its member agencies providing that they should maintain a boycott against all normember insurance agencies and all insurance companies which did not plant exclusively through the exchange outlets or its members;"' (g) an agreement among the members of a home-delivery news- dealers' association that they should boycott a newspaper unless it required newsboys making street sales of its papers to withdraw from areas in whichthe members of the association operatedj 72 (h) an agreement among plumbing contractors that they should fix prices and divide markets by (i) using an estimator who should determine the price to be charged for a job, an allocation committee who should decide which contractor should bid, and an agent who should induce journeymen and apprentice plumbers to work only for a contractor designated for the job, and (2) boycotting wholesalers who offered to sell supplies at terms and prices not agreeable to the contractors 73 (i) an agreement between an association of local lathing contractors and a local union providing that they should (i) limit the number of contractors, (2) prescribe their qualifications, (3) decide what contractors met these qualifications, (4) exclude persons from the contracting business on various grounds including arbitrary racial standards, and (5) assign plastering contractors to lathing contractors; 74 (j) an agreement among a retail grocers association and its members providing that the latter should refrain from selling below price listsi7 5 (k) an agreement among members of a retail grocers association providing that they should stabilize prices by refraining from selling below those prices fixed by the association by maintaining a six per cent mark-up and by refraining from advertising and selling for less than this mark-up;' 6 and (I) an agreement between an automobile manufacturer and dealers providing that they should tie the sales of automobiles to the financing of such transactions.
77
The first six situations described were cases where the defendants tried in vain to invoke the claim of statutory exemption from the Sherman Act based, respectively, on the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, [Vol. 1959: 236 involving labor unions, and the McCarran Act, 78 relating to the insurance business. 79 The Supreme Court held that Congress never intended that organized labor should be free to combine with businessmen to suppress competition, create a monopoly, or control the marketing of goods and services, even if such action were prompted by a desire to further the interests of the wage-earner members of a union." The "benefits to organized labor cannot be utilized as a cats-paw to pull employers' chestnuts out of the antitrust fires."" And Congress clearly did not intend that agreements to boycott, coerce, or intimidate in the insurance field should be immune from the antitrust laws.
The defense of "local conduct outside the Sherman Act" has succeeded in several lawsuits within recent years. The most notable is the first Yellow Cab case. 83 Because the Supreme Court failed completely to analyze all of the issues, its decision, in part, is of uncertain meaning and questionable soundness. The defendants were a passenger transportation company moving only between railroad terminals in Chicago, Illinois, and two firms which did not engage in this business but otherwise operated a general taxicab service throughout the city. The complaint charged a conspiracy (a) to restrain and monopolize interstate commerce in the sale of taxicabs in Chicago and three other large cities, (b) to refrain from competing in the business of transporting interstate passengers between railroad stations in Chicago, and (c) to induce the City of Chicago to limit the number of licensed taxicabs and to issue eighty-six per cent of the licenses to the two defendants operating the city-wide taxicab service. The trial court regarded the business here as "an independent local service" beyond the scope of the Sherman Act 8 ' and, accordingly, dismissed the suit.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, but only as to the first two charges. In holding the complaint sufficient as to the second charge, the Court said that the conveying of travelers between railroad terminals of the city was "dearly a part of the stream of interstate commerce.
8 5
In support of this ruling, the Court relied on The Daniel Ball."' This leading case involved a boat which operated entirely within Michigan in transporting goods which moved across the state lines. The Court had held that the vessel was engaged in intefstate commerce :87
So far as she was employed in transporting goods destined for other States, or goods brought from without the limits of Michigan and destined to places within that State . . . she was employed as an instrument of that commerce .... The fact that several different and independent agencies are employed in transporting the commodity, some acting entirely within one State, and some acting through two or more States, does in no respect affect the character of the transportation.
The Government expressly cited The Daniel Ball in its brief in the Yellow Cab case in support of its contention that the service rendered by local taxicabs in conveying interstate passengers between their homes, offices, or hotels and railroad stations was within the reach of the Sherman Act and that the alleged conspiracy of the defendants to persuade the City of Chicago to limit the number of taxicabs was, therefore, a violation of the Act. In rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court held that "such transportation is too unrelated to interstate commerce to constitute a part-thereof within the meaning of the Sherman Act," because thie relationship of the taxicabs "to interstate transit is only casual and incidental."" 8 The'Court did suggest, however, that although the normal operation of a general locaJ taxicab service is not an integral part of interstate transportation, a corispiracy to burden or eliminate transportation of passengers between their homes and a railroad station might have sufficient effect" upon interstate commerce to justify using the Sherman Act. " The opinion unfortunately casts but little light on the problem. The Supreme Court did not furnish any guide as to the kind, amount, and circumstances of adverse impact on interstate movement which it said " United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. z8, zz8 (-947 might invoke the antitrust laws. Some of its language and citations would seem to apply equally well to the transportation of a passenger from his home to a terminal as from one station to another." Furthermore, the doctrine of The Daniel Ball would appear to be applicable and, in fact, has been followed in situations functionally analogous. Thus, a local telephone company was held to be an instrument of interstate commerce in the transmission of interstate messages to and from the points it served, although its business was mainly the transmission of intrastate messages over lines lying entirely within one state." To the same effect is a ruling with reference to a common carrier which operated wholly within a state and transported goods in continuous passage from outside the state to its stations 2 It is, therefore, hard to reconcile the Yellow Cab case with the doctrine that Congress sought to go to the limit of its power in curbing restraints of trade 93 and with the basic principle that the antitrust laws prohibit local conduct which adversely affects interstate commerce. 9 4 The opinion in the Yellow Cab case also fails to answer other vital questions. For example, it does not say where interstate commerce begins and ends; whether this inquiry is one of fact or law; what, if any, presumptions are used; and how the facts are to be determined. It 00 "When persons or goods move from a point of origin in one state to a point of 4estination in another, the fact that a part of that journey consists of transportation by an independent agency solely within the boundaries of one state does not make that portion *f the trip any less interstate in character ....
That portion must be viewed in its relation to the entire journey rather than in isolation. 95 The sound and practical course for the Court might rather have been, however, to have avoided any decision based only on the pleadings as to whether taxicab transportation in the particular setting was intrastate rather than interstate commerce. The Court more wisely might have remanded the case to the trial court for a determination whether the alleged conspiracy in question had any adverse impact on the movement across state lines of any persons or property in the light of all the relevant realities of the local situation.
Under the "affectation doctrine," there are several holdings to the effect that certain price-fixing agreements at a purely local level do not violate the Sherman Act. In United States v. Starlite Drive-In," 6 the court held that an agreement among theatre exhibitors to charge uniform admission prices does not have the requisite effect on interstate commerce to be illegal. The court indicated, however, that an increase, decrease, or change of direction of movement of films from one exhibitor to another would have the kind of impact on interstate commerce that is prohibited under the antitrust laws. In United States v. San Francisco Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 7 the court held that an adverse effect on the flow of goods caused by conduct in the course of collective bargaining by employers and employees is not the kind of interference with interstate commerce which the Sherman Act forbids. Therefore, the higher prices and smaller volume of goods which follow an agreement in such a situation are regarded as merely inconsequential, remote, and unsubstantial results of legitimate labor activities, and not products of an illegal combination to fix prices. And recently, in United States v.
9'
The Court based its decision mostly on the facts that the taxicabs (a) did not cross state lines, (b) by law operated only within the city, (c) had to serve every person, (d) had no arrangement with any interstate railroad, (e) were paid only by the passenger, (f) were commonly understood to be engaged only in intrastate traffic, (g) were but one means of conveyance, and (h) intermingled local passengers with interstate travelers. It is the view of the writer that these tests are not realistic or practical. Many seem to be irrelevant, and none goes to the very crux of the inquiry before the Court as to whether interstate commerce was restrained or monopolized.
: Foremost Dairies, Inc., the court, after trial, based its dismissal of an indictment charging price-fixing on the ground that the Government had failed to establish the interstate nature of any other than a very minimal amount of any products supplied to the purchasers. 9 "
In the course of applying the "affectation doctrine" to intrastate conduct, some courts appear to be making findings of fact independent of the pleadings or evidence before them. In the Mandeville Farms case, mentioned above, which was decided on the sufficiency of the plaintiff's amended complaint, the Court appears to have taken judicial notice of some effects of purely local conduct on interstate commerce when it said: 99 There were indeed two distinct effects flowing from the agreement for paying uniform prices, one immediately upon the price received by the grower rendering it devoid of all competitive influences in amount; the other, the necessary and inevitable effect of that agreement in the setting of the industry as a whole, to reduce competition in the distribution of sugar.
The Court there said, in substance, that it is impossible to accept the idea that stabilization of prices paid for the only raw material consumed in an industry has no tendency to reduce competition in the distribution of a finished product in an integrated industry, such as was involved in that case. The Court further observed that the foregoing effects, which permeated the entire structure of and were reflected throughout the industry, were the necessary and inevitable results of the agreement among the refiners to pay uniform prices for beets in the circumstances of the case.
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In United States v. Detroit Sheet Metal Roofing Ass'n,' 0 ' the court likewise appeared to take judicial notice of the effects on interstate commerce of a price-fixing scheme occurring after the interstate movement of the goods had come to an end. In this case, the indictment alleged that the necessary effect of the price-fixing agreement in question was (a) to suppress and eliminate competition, (b) to establish noncompetitive prices, (c) to establish high prices, and (d) to deny to consumers the benefits of free competition. In the course of holding this indictment sufficient, the court apparently took it for granted that if these general seemingly local effects occurred, they would be followed by certain specific consequences to interstate commerce, observing: 1 0 2
The fixing and maintenance of high prices for roofing construction and repair points to a reduction in the volume of such activity with a resultant reduction in the consumption of roofiing materials, and a retardation of the flow of such materials from the out-of-state manufacturers throughout interstate channels of distribution. The effects of price-fixing have acquired such recognized status in the antitrust laws that when such a charge is made, I am compelled to take cognizance of such effect in reading the indictment.
In United States v. Universal Milk Bottle Service,' 0° the indictment charged that effects of a price-fixing agreement were (a) to increase the price of the commodity involved to consumers, (b) to reduce the amount to consumers, and (c) to impair its quality. The court said that the "fixing of prices as alleged in the indictment necessarily operates as a direct and substantial restraint in the interstate commerce herein involved." 4 It seems, therefore, that the court, again, was making an a priori finding of fact-one not based on facts supplied by the pleadings or evidence-that such effects on interstate commerce are unavoidable.
United States v. Northeast Texas Chapter," 5 appears to be another case where the court made an independent finding of fact of the effect on interstate commerce of a local price-fixing agreement. The indictment here verbalized the effects of the price-fixing agreement on interstate commerce in terms only of "restraint." Yet, the court rejected the defendant's contention that such transactions do not directly affect or tend to affect a restraint upon interstate commerce, saying: 00 In the vei7 nature of trade and commerce alleged, these ag-eeienti, some per se, 'and others as matter of fact, constitute an illegal'restraint upon interstate commerce....
-The-foregoing -analysis -of intrastate commerce affecting interstate commerce indicates that the standard of "affectation" is still fluid. To date, this.doctrine has been phrased in both general and particularized factual terms. There is some evidence in judicial opinions that the 10 2 Id. at 88. distinction made by the court in the. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers case between price-fixing as a per se violation under the "in commerce" theory and price-fixing as a per se violation under the "affect commerce" theory is becoming less sharp. The growing trend may be in the direction of attaching general legal significance to the specific circumstance of local price-fixing or boycotting or any other local conduct affecting persons, property, or communications moving across state lines. If this occurs, the courts may then consider such intrastate conduct as at least presumptive evidence of the more broadly stated, but perhaps no more precisely defined, vital fact of "adverse affect upon interstate commerce."
The consequences of such subdefinition may be to increase the impact of the antitrust laws on purely local business activities. The likely result would be a general proposition applicable to an entire class of cases. The courts will probably then, as a matter of fact, judicially notice that where price-fixing, and perhaps other conduct, wholly within a state is an inseparable element of an integrated industry having interstate economic continuity, it necessarily affects interstate commerce. If so, the courts will, as a matter of law, hold that such price-rigging or other conduct with the same end result is a per se Sherman Act violation.
We can conclude our canvass of the applicability of the Sherman Act to local conduct with a few basic observations. What is involved is not the narrow type of legal precept which is clear and objective in content and automatic in operation. It is, rather, a practical standard requiring a rigorous analysis of the facts. The courts have generally been aware of the economic facts of life. Accordingly, they have realized that it would be utterly futile to try to find the precise line which separates interstate from intrastate commerce, that the focal point of the antitrust laws is rather the adverse impact on free movement of trade across state lines. Avoiding a jurisprudence of rigidity, the courts have generally used a functional approach. They have thus given life to a basically workable doctrine which makes for an effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.
